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Abstract An important obstacle to lawhood in the special sciences is the worry
that such laws would require metaphysically extravagant conspiracies among fun-
damental particles. How, short of conspiracy, is this possible? In this paper we’ll
review a number of strategies that allow for the projectibility of special science
generalizations without positing outlandish conspiracies: non-Humean pluralism,
classical MRL theories of laws, and Albert and Loewer’s theory. After arguing that
none of the above fully succeed, we consider the conspiracy problem through the
lens of our preferred view of laws, an elaboration of the MRL view that we call the
Better Best System (BBS) theory. BBS offers a picture on which, although all
events supervene on a fundamental level, there is no one unique locus of projec-
tibility; rather there are a large number of loci corresponding to the different areas
(ecology, economics, solid-state chemistry, etc.) in which there are simple and
strong generalizations to be made. While we expect that some amount of conspir-
acy-fear-inducing special science projectibility is inevitable given BBS, we’ll argue
that this is unobjectionable. It follows from BBS that the laws of any particular
special or fundamental science amount to a proper subset of the laws. From this
vantage point, the existence of projectible special science generalizations not
guaranteed by the fundamental laws is not an occasion for conspiracy fantasies, but
a predictable fact of life in a complex world.
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If we are on the outside, we assume a conspiracy is the perfect working of a
scheme. Silent nameless men with unadorned hearts. A conspiracy is
everything that ordinary life is not. It’s the inside game, cold, sure,
undistracted, forever closed off to us. We are the flawed ones, the innocents,
trying to make some rough sense of the daily jostle. Conspirators have a logic
and a daring beyond our reach. All conspiracies are the same taut story of men
who find coherence in some criminal act.
Don DeLillo, “In Dallas,” pt. 2, Libra (1988).
1 Introduction: Special Science Laws and the Conspiracy Problem
Consider the so-called first principle of population dynamics, Malthus’s exponential
law:
PðtÞ ¼ P0ert
where P0 is the initial population (say, of rabbits), r the growth rate, and t the time.
This ecological generalization is very powerful. It supports counterfactuals and
crucially enters ecological predictions and explanations. It has an undeniably central
role in most presentations of the science of ecology. Indeed, it arguably has the very
same central role in ecology that Newton’s first law does in classical mechanics:
both express a kind of ideal default behavior—exceptions to which are to be
explained with further laws (Ginzburg and Colyvan 2004). In short, pending some
good reason for distinguishing Malthus’s Law over Newton’s first law, there is good
reason for taking seriously the idea that the former should count as a bona fide law
of nature. (If you don’t like “law of nature”, substitute “widely applicable
projectible generalization” in its stead.)
However, famously, philosophers have suggested a number of reasons for
doubting that there can be laws in ecology and other special sciences. In particular,
recent discussion has focused on the worry that recognizing special science laws
would require positing a metaphysically extravagant conspiracy among fundamental
particles to explain why the physical objects constituting rabbits (etc.) “know” to
move, projectibly, in ways consistent with Malthus’s Law. To be sure, the facts
needed to harmonize regularities at different levels can be quite puzzling. For since
Malthus’s Law supervenes on a combination of what is projectible (the fundamental
physical laws) and what is not projectible (the initial conditions), it can begin to
look suspiciously as if the bunnies (or their constituent particles) are conspiring to
bring things off just right. But surely that can’t be right? Here are a couple of writers
expressing wonder about this matter:
The very existence of the special sciences testifies to reliable macro-level
regularities that are realized by mechanisms whose physical substance is quite
typically heterogeneous…. Damn near everything we know about the world
suggests that unimaginably complicated to-ings and fro-ings of bits and pieces
at the extreme micro-level manage somehow to converge on stable macro-
level properties (Fodor 1997, p. 160).
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One can easily join Fodor in the mood of feeling that it is “molto
mysterioso,” that the motions of particles (and fields) to-ing and fro-ing in
accordance with F = ma (or whatever the fundamental dynamical laws prove
to be) lawfully end up converging on the regularities of the special sciences.
How do the particles that e.g., constitute an economy “know” that their
trajectories are required (ceteris paribus) to enforce Gresham’s law? (Loewer
2009).
This is, indeed, curious, and, we think, demands some kind of explanation.1
In this paper we want to face the conspiracy problem squarely. Our question will
be how best to formulate a theory of lawhood that allows for laws in the special
sciences without resorting to positing outlandish conspiracies. In addition, we want
to insist on respecting two further constraints. First, our theory of lawhood should
provide for Malthus’s Law a kind of metaphysical autonomy from what is going on
at more fundamental levels; while this constraint will need some fleshing out below,
the rough motivation is that ecologists shouldn’t need to know or care about the
standards for formulating physical laws in order to give Malthus’s Law its central
role in their science. And second, we assume that ecological (and other higher-level)
kinds supervene on lower-level physical kinds—there is no e´lan lapin whose
exemplification fails to be fixed by the distribution of fundamental physical kinds.
Whether we can have all of these things at once is, we think, central to the
metaphysical concerns many have had about reduction. Importantly, our list of
desiderata is not a mere shopping list, but rather collects the crucial ingredients in
what we see as a fundamental question: How can the special science laws be
projectible when they supervene upon a basis that is partly projectible (lower-level
laws) and partly not projectible (initial and boundary conditions)?2
In what follows we’ll review a number of strategies for solving the conspiracy
problem—i.e., for allowing for the projectibility of special science generalizations
without positing outlandish conspiracies. Some of these strategies turn on accepting
accounts of laws (e.g., non-Humean pluralist and classical MRL theories, Sect. 2–3)
on which the problem of conspiracy cannot arise in the first place. Alas, we’ll argue,
these accounts do less than we should want a theory of laws to do, and so should be
1 The so-called “problem of explanatory exclusion” is a related, and well-worn, problem in philosophy of
mind (Kim 1989). In our terminology, the problem is to explain how the realizers of (functionally
individuated) mental state types “know” to act in ways compatible with higher-level laws of psychology.
The standard view in philosophy of mind effectively answers this question by assuming that both
psychological states and their subvening physical realizers are both causally efficacious—thus obviating
conspiracy on the part of the physical realizers. But, Kim and others have objected, accepting this view
threatens causal overdetermination of the outcome. And, just as in the discussion about laws, this situation
has led some to abandon projectibility at the higher level (i.e., to give up the hope for a bona fide science
of psychology), to make the projectibility at the high level a determinate result of goings on at the lower
level (i.e., to give up on the autonomy of psychology), or to abandon the idea that psychological kinds
supervene on physical kinds.
2 A further, and much-discussed, set of problems about reduction concerns scientific methodology and
scientific explanation. The methodological issue is whether and how the project of formulating special
science laws is appropriately constrained by the goal of integrating those laws with those at lower levels.
The main explanatory issue is whether higher level generalizations such as Malthus’s Law (perhaps
together with other higher level generalizations) can supply genuine explanations without enlisting lower-
level (physical) kinds or laws. We’ll largely ignore these issues in what follows.
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rejected. Next (Sect. 4) we’ll take on a recent strategy, due to Albert (2001) and
Loewer (2009), that aims to solve the conspiracy problem by treating special science
regularities as probabilistic corollaries of statistical postulates over low-level initial
conditions. We’ll argue that, while this view deals admirably with the supervenience
constraint and may also obviate conspiracy, it rests on unrealistic and insufficiently
general assumptions about the relation between special and fundamental sciences.
Finally (Sect. 5), we’ll present our own favored view of laws, a revised version MRL
theory that we have called the Better Best System (BBS) (Cohen and Callender
2009). BBS offers a picture on which, although all events supervene on a
fundamental level, there is no one unique locus of projectibility; rather there are a
large number of loci corresponding to the different areas (ecology, economics, solid-
state chemistry, etc.) in which there are simple and strong generalizations to be made.
While we expect that some amount of conspiracy-fear-inducing special science
projectibility is inevitable given BBS, we’ll argue that this is unobjectionable. It
follows from BBS that the laws of any particular special or fundamental science
amount to a proper subset of the laws. From this vantage point, the existence of
projectible special science generalizations not guaranteed by the fundamental laws is
not an occasion for conspiracy fantasies, but a predictable fact of life in a complex
world.
2 Non-Humean Pluralism
The view we’re dubbing Non-Humean Pluralism is frequently motivated by
noticing that special science generalizations have two features that laws are
typically assumed not to allow: they are (by definition) formulated in terms of non-
fundamental kinds, and they tolerate exceptions (the so-called problem of the
provisos). And yet, many have thought, such generalizations are not only true but
projectible: this is why we are inclined to apply Malthus’s Law next time questions
about bunny distribution arise. Such observations have led some to favor a picture
of the special sciences as involving (not laws, but) apparatus found outside the
so-called Humean mosaic of events—apparatus that includes causal principles,
mechanisms, capacities, invariances, powers, dispositions, and the like. Thus, for
example, Cartwright (1989) suggests that the regularity that aspirins relieve
headaches must be explained by adding “capacities” or “singular causes” of
particular aspirins—features not found in the Humean mosaic, but which secure for
the generalization about aspirins a strength it could not otherwise obtain. Namely,
these elements ensure, projectibly, that the higher-level cause bring about the
higher-level effect in certain circumstances.
Although logically detachable, the view we have in mind couples this non-
Humeanism with a kind of ontological egalitarianism among levels. On Cart-
wright’s view, the world is “dappled”: objects are endowed with capacities that
produce regularities only in certain highly limited scenarios. These scenarios might
be in the economic, biological or physical realms (among others), where no one
realm is distinguished as fundamental. Although there are significant differences
among them, positions similar to Cartwright’s are found in the work of Dupre´
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(1993), Giere (2006), and Teller (2010). On all of these views, science provides
windows onto the world, but these windows are always partial and usually
somewhat opaque. Nor can they be assembled together to form one true consistent
picture. Crucially, the disunified picture of the world found in scientific method-
ology is mirrored for these authors by a genuine ontological disunification. As a
result, there is no more reason to assert that the physical determines the ecological
than the other way around.
The good news about Non-Humean Pluralist theories of the kind under
consideration is that they answer to several of our desiderata. First, they are
designed specifically to accommodate the projectibility of higher-level generaliza-
tions, even if the latter are not officially counted as laws. Either way, the intention is
to allow that these generalizations can do the things we want laws to do—figure in
explanations, support counterfactuals, and so on. So we can grant that they make
room for robust special science generalizations (albeit not laws). Second, the view
accepts the metaphysical autonomy of the special sciences in positing genuine
higher-level elements (the capacities, singular causes, and whatnot) absent at the
lower levels: generalizations involving the latter entities can’t even be stated in
lower-level vocabulary, since these entities don’t occur at the lower level. Third,
there’s no mystery about how lower-level entities know to conform to higher-level
regularities; indeed, on this pluralistic picture that question can’t arise. Each non-
fundamental level has non-Humean elements that ensure that the regularities at that
level (and only at that level) obtain. But these non-Humean elements and the entities
themselves aren’t stitched together into a unified picture that allows the worry about
how these regularities are harmonized (more on this immediately below).
For all their virtues, however, such views blithely give up one of the constraints
we want to enforce—the supervenience of bunnies and other high-level entities on
the lower-level kinds. According to the disunified picture, supervenience of macro-
kinds/properties on micro-kinds/properties is willingly eschewed. Within each
theory one can see this different ways. Cartwright (1999, pp. 32–33), for instance,
gives up supervenience in part because of her view of all science being ceteris
paribus.3 Dupre´ (2001, p. 161) reaches the same conclusion because of his belief in
“downward causation”, i.e., causation by the high-level properties on the low-level
properties. And Teller (2010) (and presumably Giere, though Giere (2006) doesn’t
discuss supervenience itself) thinks the different windows onto the world don’t have
to add up to a single coherent picture of one world. In all cases, what is seen through
the ecology window needn’t mesh with what is seen through that of physics, and
3 To be fair, Cartwright (1999) may be read as endorsing supervenience in certain limited cases. She
writes, for instance, that “We do not want colour patches to appear in regions from which the laws of
physics have carried away all matter and energy” (p. 33). When supervenience holds, then, she does seem
to face the worry about harmonizing the two levels. She sees this worry and answers with a kind of
theological parable (p. 33). In one, dubbed the reductionist picture, God creates the universe by specifying
the laws of physics and the precise initial conditions; God then leaves to Saint Peter the computationally
tricky task of deriving the higher-level regularities. In the other, dubbed the pluralist picture, God instead
cares about regularities, and writes down all the micro- and macro-regularities the world should have;
Saint Peter is then charged with finding initial conditions such that these regularities all hold. While this
story is evocative, it doesn’t yet answer our worry: intuitively “conspiratorial” initial conditions will still
need to be specified, whether by God or by Saint Peter.
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supervenience is abandoned. We can now better see how the conspiracy worry is
avoided on such views. Supervenience is a crucial ingredient of the worry. Without
it there is no mystery, for we don’t assume that the regular behaviors of entities at
different levels have to be harmonized.
Yet for us the price of abandoning supervenience is too great. If we have reason
to believe anything in science, it’s that macroscopic entities are constituted by
microscopic ones and their relations. If we insist on this, as we do, Non-Humean
Pluralism won’t do all of the things we want our metaphysics of science to do.
Moreover, to the extent that the theory relies on non-Humean additions to
scientific ontology—additions that contribute to the denial of supervenience—there
is a question whether they earn their keep. Of course, there are many large issues
surrounding Humean versus non-Humean views of the world, and we will not tackle
them here. Suffice to say, however, that there exist many powerful concerns about
capacities and the like—what they are, how we know them, etc. (Psillos 2002,
§7.4.2)—and whether they help us understand special science generalizations
(Psillos (2002, §7.4); Schrenk (2007)). Given these concerns about non-Humean
treatments of projectible generalizations, we’d prefer, if we can, to find a position
that carries the advantages of such views without requiring supervenience-violating
additions to the Humean mosaic.
3 Classical MRL
Given that we want our theory of lawhood to respect supervenience in a way that
non-Humean accounts do not, we now want to turn to what is perhaps the most
important of the (broadly Humean) views that make supervenience a central virtue.
The account we have in mind is the “Best System” or (classical) MRL view
associated with Mill, Ramsey, and Lewis.
Classical MRL starts by conceiving of our knowledge of the world as a deductive
system containing axioms and results derived from those axioms.4 Of course, there
will be different ways of arranging our knowledge of the world into such a
deductive system. Some such systems will be stronger than others in the sense that
they contain (among their axioms and derived consequences) more truths about the
world than others—some such systematizations carry more information about the
world, or, equivalently, rule out more possible ways the world might have been,
than others. Other true deductive systems will be simpler than others in the senses
that they include a smaller set of independent axioms or are syntactically less
complex.5 Significantly, strength and simplicity seem to be competing virtues:
adding more axioms to a system increases a system’s strength at the cost of
simplicity, while taking away axioms increases simplicity at the cost of strength.
4 For canonical statements, see Lewis (1973, pp. 73ff), Lewis (1983, pp. 365–368), Earman (1986);
Lewis (1994, pp. 478ff) extends the view to incorporate objective chances.
5 Understanding the simplicity of a system is a difficult problem that we won’t attempt to resolve here.
For a non-syntactic alternative, it is possible to regard simplicity in a manner more connected to scientific
practice. For instance, we might consider that a system merits the simplicity score it gets based on how
well it embodies various theoretical virtues, e.g., unification, consilience.
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The heart of the MRL approach to lawhood is to say that a true generalization is a
law if and only if it is an axiom of all the “Best Systems”—axiomatic
systematizations that best balance strength and simplicity. A generalization like
Schro¨dinger’s equation might plausibly count as a law on this account because any
deductive system lacking it would be inferior in strength (by leaving out many truths
about the world) or simplicity (by recapturing the otherwise left-out truths only by
including a huge list of underived axioms about the locations of particles at each
moment). In contrast, the true generalization that all your children have brown hair
is plausibly something that could be captured in a Best System without making it a
law (viz., it wouldn’t be too costly in terms of simplicity to include axioms listing
all your children and their hair color, from which we could derive the needed result
as a consequence).
There is a lot to like about the classical MRL account of laws. In a systematic
assessment, Loewer (1996) points out that MRL captures many of the most
important features of laws, including ensuring that laws are explanatory, are
confirmed by their instances, and support counterfactuals. Moreover we are
unconvinced by most of the criticism of MRL in the literature, which consists
largely of imagined counter-examples—scenarios in which we are invited to share
the intuition that there are laws other than those occuring in the Best System (see
Carroll (1994) and references therein). We find these criticisms unconvincing
because, as Earman (1986) and Loewer (1996) point out, these alleged counterex-
amples beg the crucial question in taking the regularities at issue to be laws. Finally,
classical MRL respects the supervenience requirement: on this view, what makes a
generalization a law is simply its occurrence as an axiom of all the Best Systems—
not its relation to special entities from outside the Humean mosaic. Therefore, the
view does not require the introduction of new, non-supervenient entities to figure in
laws.6
Despite its many attractions, classical MRL also has its problems.
First, the view has difficulty making room for laws in the special sciences. This is
because classical MRL requires (as do many other traditional theories of lawhood)
that laws must relate fundamental natural properties; but, of course, special science
generalizations (by definition) don’t. One might attempt to overcome this problem
by “translating” higher-level predicates into low-level disjunctive predicates and
then joining the disjunctive predicates into would-be laws. But this won’t help
proponents of MRL, since the results of such translations will be non-simple.
Moreover, special science generalizations tolerate exceptions and are generally
incomplete descriptions of reality; therefore, candidate special science generaliza-
tions will plausibly lose in terms of strength to candidate fundamental laws.
Consequently, it is plausible that the generalizations of the special sciences are
neither simple nor strong, so couldn’t be MRL laws.
6 This is not enough to guarantee supervenience; it only shows that supervenience won’t be violated in
the way in which non-Humeans violate it. But in fact proponents of MRL typically go onto endorse the
generalization that the distribution of high-level kinds is fixed by the distribution of fundamental kinds.
That said, it is also worth noting that classical MRL is independent of the further thesis (sometimes called
“Humean supervenience”) that everything supervenes upon local matters of particular fact (Lewis, 1986b,
p. ix).
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What about the autonomy constraint? Strictly speaking, it appears, trivially, that
classical MRL cannot secure the autonomy of special science laws since (as we have
just noted) it cannot recognize special science laws at all. Slightly less strictly
speaking, however, classical MRL appears to abide by the spirit, if not the letter, of
the autonomy constraint. While classical MRL may not recognize special science
generalizations as laws, it can still recognize them—namely, as (a subset of) the
conclusions derivable from the MRL laws together with a set of initial conditions.
And it appears that the special science generalizations, considered as derived
consequences of the MRL laws together with a set of initial conditions, are indeed
autonomous from the fundamental laws: for the proposal is that they are derivable
not just from the laws of physics, but from those laws together with initial
conditions. Alas, making the higher-level autonomous in this way leads directly to
the worry about conspiracy. For it means that the laws of the lower level fail to
determine behavior at the higher-level.
Aside from the worries we have raised concerning the desiderata of Sect. 1, there
are serious further internal problems with classical MRL. In our view, the most
serious of these concerns the theory’s use of inter-system comparisons of strength,
simplicity, and balance.7 This problem arises because assessments of simplicity are
inherently relative to an inventory of basic kinds or basic predicates. Loewer brings
out this point by reference to a famous example from Goodman (1954):
There is a problem concerning the languages in which the best systems are
formulated. Simplicity, being partly syntactical, is sensitive to the language in
which a theory is formulated, and so different choices of simple predicates can
lead to different verdicts concerning simplicity. A language that contains
‘grue’ and ‘bleen’ as simple predicates but not ‘green’ will count ‘All
emeralds are green’ as more complex than will a language that contains
‘green’ as a simple predicate (Loewer 1996, p. 109).
Adapting terminology from Quine (1970), simplicity is an immanent rather than
than transcendent notion: it is defined relative to a set of basic kinds or basic
predicates. An immediate consequence of the immanence of simplicity is that there
is no way of making relative simplicity assessments between systems that disagree
with respect to the basic kinds (systems that differ in respect of the terms they make
available for basic kinds). This is a problem for MRL because, as set out above, that
account demands that we engage in inter-system comparisons of relative simplicity.
It has been less frequently noted (but not unnoticed) that the strength of a
deductive system is, likewise, immanent rather than transcendent, as is the notion of
balance among systems (see Cohen and Callender 2009).
Prima facie, the realization that simplicity, strength, and balance are immanent—
what we’ll call the problem of immanent comparisons—is a devastating blow to
MRL. For what counts as a law according to that view depends on what is a Best
System; but the immanence of simplicity and strength undercut the possibility of
7 The worry as it applies to simplicity has been noted by Lewis (1983, pp. 366–368), Lewis (1986a,
pp. 123–124), Earman (1986), van Fraassen (1989, pp. 41–43, 51–55), Taylor (1993, p. 82); Loewer
(1996, p. 109).
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intersystem comparisons, and therefore the very idea of something’s being a Best
System.
Another way the problem manifests itself is via a trivialization worry raised by
Lewis (1983, p. 42), (cf. Loewer 1996, p. 109). This difficulty arises from
consideration of the kind F that holds of all and only things in the world where an
arbitrary system S holds. If allowed to compete, it’s hard to see why the trivial
generalization ⌜(x)Fx⌝ wouldn’t be the Best System for all such worlds: it is very
simple, and also very strong (it strictly implies all truths, and so, if individuals are
world-bound, singles out a unique possible world). Consequently, this trivial
generalization would be the one law for any world.
Both versions of the problem cry out for solution by distinguishing some special
set of basic predicates or kinds. If we insist that all the putative Best Systems be
written in a privileged vocabulary (refer to some distinguished set of kinds), then we
can make inter-system comparisons of simplicity, strength and balance. And we can
also rule out noxious predicates like the above ⌜F ⌝ for failing to occur in our
privileged vocabulary/inventory of kinds. Thus, Lewis (1986a) holds that, as a
matter of fact, certain “perfectly natural” fundamental kinds are basic and others are
not, and that only axiomatizations expressed in terms of these perfectly natural
kinds are candidates for being Best Systems. However, as we have argued elsewhere
(Cohen and Callender 2009), this solution has the defect that, because it fails what
Earman (1986, p. 85) calls the “empiricist loyalty test,” it makes lawhood
epistemically inaccessible.8 Briefly, we can bring out the problem by considering
two possible worlds, w1 and w2, such that the generalization ⌜(x)(Fx⊃ Gx)⌝ is part of
the on balance simplest and strongest system in both, but where ⌜F ⌝ and ⌜G ⌝ refer to
perfectly natural kinds in w1 but not w2. Unfortunately, there seems to be no way of
telling what world we’re in, so, given Lewis’s solution, no way of telling whether
the generalization at issue is a law. Normally we can’t tell whether what we think is
the best system given some kinds really is the Best System, but perfect naturalness
adds an extra layer of skeptical possibility. Even if we saw all of world history,
possessed unlimited computing power, and so on, we still couldn’t determine if
the kinds picked out by ⌜F ⌝ and ⌜G ⌝ were perfectly natural, and so, whether
⌜(x)(Fx ⊃ Gx)⌝ is really a law of nature.
In all, then, though we are sympathetic to the classical MRL position, it seems
that we need to look elsewhere to meet our needs. In the next two sections,
therefore, we’ll explore two different ways of modifying classical MRL, and
consider the consequences of these modifications for the conspiracy problem.
4 Special Sciences as Probabilistic Corollaries
One of the more important developments to emerge from recent work on laws is an
elaboration of classical MRL that, although formulated in terms of the fundamental
8 As Cohen and Callender (2009) emphasize, this criticism goes through on even a very general
formulation of the empiricist loyalty test that should be acceptable to empiricists and non-empiricists
alike.
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lower level kinds, is intended to capture higher-level probabilistic generalizations
such as those of thermodynamics (Lewis 1994; Albert 2001; Loewer 2004, 2009). In
outline, the idea here is that simply adding to candidate Best Systems a statistical
postulate over the universe’s initial conditions will—at very little cost to simplicity
—significantly add to their strength by putting thermodynamic generalizations
within their grasp. Thus Albert (2001) suggests that, to explain high-level thermal
generalizations from the perspective of microphysics, physics (via statistical
mechanics) posits a probability distribution over the precise initial conditions of the
universe. The initial conditions with greatest probabilistic weight then trace
histories that we would call thermodynamic. Since adding this posit to physical
candidate best systems increases their overall balance of strength and simplicity, the
resulting Systems rather than those without the posit are truly Best, hence truly law-
constitutive. If so, then the thermodynamic generalizations really would be laws,
hence projectible.
This treatment of thermal generalizations is very satisfying. While fully
embracing the idea that macroscopic thermodynamic systems supervene upon more
basic physical entities, it explains how generalizations in the special sciences can be
projectible—viz., by tracing out objectively likely histories in state space. Moreover,
it rids the world of conspiracy by making the truth of such generalizations objectively
likely: air is spontaneously spreading through its available volume because that is the
most likely thing for it to do, given the probability distribution assigned to the
microstates underlying the air.
This idea can be found, of course, in the work of Gibbs, Maxwell and especially
Boltzmann. However, as Albert (2001) and Loewer (2009) develop it, this
understanding of statistical mechanics turns out to have an astoundingly broad
explanatory scope. Once one places a probability distribution over the world’s
precise initial microstates, then the theory implies more than probability assign-
ments for thermodynamic macrostates and their generalizations. The theory will
also assign probabilities to any generalization whatsoever. Thus Albert (2001)
speaks of this fundamental chance plus the laws entailing a probability assignment
for spatulas being found in kitchens versus other rooms of apartments. And Loewer
(2009) extends this to all the special science generalizations in an effort to deal
with the conspiracy problem. The idea is that the fundamental chance assigns
probabilities not only to thermal generalizations, but also to bunnies reproducing
according to Malthus’s Law, economic generalizations, psychological generaliza-
tions, and even regularities not encoded in any particular science, e.g., the claim
about spatulas. These regularities will either be heavily weighted, probabilistically,
by this primordial chance, or not. If they are heavily weighted, then, of course, there
is no conspiracy. Bunnies aren’t conspiring any more than particles are when they
spread out through a room. We explain why the particles are to-ing and fro-ing
appropriately—we explain how they “know” to orchestrate kosher histories—by
saying that most evolutions of the state space according to the privileged measure
are those in which they do so. Furthermore, we can turn this reasoning around: since
these special science regularities keep happening, and seem to be projectible, it must
be that they are indeed heavily weighted by the fundamental chance, for otherwise
they are, literally, a lucky run. If you keep rolling a die and it predictably lands on 3
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one-sixth the time, one expects a probabilistic mechanism to be responsible for this.
After a certain time, it can’t just be luck. What Albert and Loewer do is offer the
fundamental chance and laws as the mechanism responsible for why the special
science regularities keep materializing. With this fundamental chance we have no
conspiracies but a “unified science” program that is, in some senses, stronger even
than the aspirations of Oppenheim and Putnam (1958).
Although we have sketched it briefly, we hope we have made clear the outlines of
Albert’s and Loewer’s view and shown that it offers a non-conspiratorial
explanation of some higher-level generalizations. On this solution, we explain
why the formerly accidental occurrence of special science patterns instead becomes
probabilistically necessary, thereby making the relevant special science general-
izations projectible. Moreover, because it is such an ontologically conservative
extension of the classical MRL picture, it inherits from its predecessor the
advantage of respecting supervenience: the Albert-Loewer view agrees with
classical MRL in the distribution of fundamental and non-fundamental properties,
so respects supervenience exactly to the extent classical MRL does. Although we
might quibble with their take on the statistical mechanical account of the
thermodynamic generalizations, overall, we find this account impressive. So far,
then, so good.
Unfortunately, we are unconvinced that the view under consideration merits
acceptance.
For one thing, although we accept for the sake of this paper that the view makes
sense of the non-conspiratorial projectibility of the generalizations of thermody-
namics, we are deeply skeptical that it can be extended to all other genuine higher-
level generalizations.9 For this extension to succeed, it must be that all genuine and
truly regular generalizations—e.g., presumably, Malthus’s Law—are likely accord-
ing to the chance posited by physics. We doubt that this requirement can be
sustained.
There is not a shred of evidence that the chances used in ecology are the ones
used in statistical mechanics. A chance is relative to a particular measure over a
particular state space. The statistical mechanical chance is based on Lebesgue
measure over phase space (3n-positional dimensions and 3n-momenta dimensions,
where n is the number of particles). Ecological systems are sometimes modeled via
state spaces with measures on them—sometimes even Lebesgue measure. However,
the physical and ecological chances are unrelated, to our knowledge, because the
state spaces are different. The (classical) physical one is parametrized with respect
to position and conjugate momentum, the ecological ones are parametrized with
respect to ecological variables, such as ‘number of age 1 females’, ‘number of age 2
females’, and so on. Are the generalizations that are highly probable in the one
space highly probable in the other? We have no idea, and neither does anyone else.
The solution in question requires that all of this work out, but we don’t see any
reason for such confidence.
To press the point a little, let’s step back and note that, logically speaking, it is
easy to construct the following. Take a trajectory through one state space that is
9 See Callender (2010) for alternative views and a more thorough discussion of thermodynamics.
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typical according to the probability measure adapted to that space. Now “translate”
this trajectory into another state space. Then it’s certainly possible that, with respect
to a probability measure on that second state space, the resulting trajectory is
atypical. Just think of a sequence of coin flips of a fair coin as described by the
standard measure in a ‘heads/tails’ state space. Now translate this sequence into a
state space based on a different partitioning of this sequence of events (say, a
‘flipped-by-a-female/flipped-by-a-male’ state space, or an ‘initial-state-heads-up/
initial-state-tails-up’ state space). Depending on the partition, there is no special
reason to think that that sequence of events is typical with respect to the new
measure, even if it’s an intuitively natural one.
Given that this is possible, it is difficult to believe that Albert’s and Loewer’s
confidence is warranted, if for no other reason than that there are so many cases to
cover. The class of so far empirically adequate generalizations—call it G—is
enormous. G includes all of what’s successful in ecology, biology, economics, as
well as more mundane general facts—e.g., that in households pillows tend to be on
the beds. Surely it is implausible that every single generalization g in G is weighted
heavily by Lebesgue measure when g is translated into phase space (whatever that
would look like). Human beings are marvelous pattern detectors and find all sorts of
pairs of patterns/partitions in nature. To think that everything we discover will turn
out to be typical patterns in phase space according to Lebesgue measure is
extremely optimistic. Surely, that is, some of these gs are due to special (non-
projectible) initial conditions or lucky runs according to the Lebesgue measure
chance. We have no idea how many generalizations there are like this. They might
be some of our very best generalizations in some of our best theories. In the face of
this ignorance, it seems fantastic to hope that all, or even most, of the gs in G turn
out probabilistically likely according to Lebesgue measure on phase space. This
suggests that the solution at issue non-conspiratorially explains the projectibility of
only a proper subset G* of the generalizations in G. Conspiracy is still afoot.
Moreover, the worry just developed can be turned around. Call the set of
generalizations that are typical with respect to Lebesgue measure on phase space T.
Then we have argued that there is no reason to think that all of G is a subset of T,
and consequently, that the conspiracy problem lives. But there is also no reason to
believe that every generalization t in T is a member of G. That possibility is just as
awkward as the other one for this view. In this case, the view would be telling us
that t is a special science law even though no scientist would have reason to think it
is. This point leads us to our next criticism, namely, that from the point of view of
the constraints mentioned in Sect. 1: it seems to threaten the autonomy of the special
sciences to which it does extend.
First off, autonomy seems threatened from the beginning since to the extent that
the view has anything to say about a generalization g, it does so precisely by treating
g as a probabilistic corollary of fundamental physics.10 A proponent might respond
that, although the truth of the generalizations in G is probabilistically fixed by the
fundamental physics (including its chance), there is still a methodological sense in
10 This allows that there might be physically accessible worlds where g fails; such worlds would be
treated by the view as objectively unlikely.
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which special sciences are autonomous. Ecologists can discover, formulate, and use
Malthus’s Law without knowing any physics at all, and without caring whether this
and the other generalizations they work with are derivable from the laws of physics,
or the laws of physics plus bridge laws, or the laws of physics plus statistical
postulates, or anything else. Of course, the Albert-Loewer view holds that the
special science laws are so derivable; but it needn’t require that special scientists
know or care about this fact. On the other hand, the position under discussion does
seem to amount to a long run constraint on the acceptability of laws in the special
sciences: whether or not any particular special scientist knows or cares about what
happens at the end of inquiry, the view still has it that those generalizations that fail
to be probabilistic corollaries of fundamental physics are ipso facto not laws.
There is another sense in which this view fails to respect the autonomy of the
special sciences. The Albert-Loewer view holds that a true special science
generalization g not derivable from the fundamental physical laws plus statistical
postulates is objectively unlikely. The continuing satisfaction of g so far is
analogous to a long run of rollings 7s whose continuation cannot be assumed for
even the very next case. But from the perspective of the relevant special science, g
might enjoy the very same virtues as a distinct generalization g’ that is deemed
objectively likely by the Albert-Loewer view. Both g and g’ might, as far as we can
see, support counterfactuals, play a role in explanations, and even play a central role
in the theoretical core of the relevant science. To impugn g for reasons entirely
external to the science in which it plays a role strikes us as very much against the
spirit of autonomy.
And finally, as mentioned, plausibly there will be generalizations t that are not in
G. If anything is an affront to autonomy, this is. For t, in virtue of being in T, is the
generalization that truly supports counterfactuals, plays a role in explanation, and so
on because it is likely according to the primordial chance. Special scientists forming
the best system over their predicates might even consider and reject t. Yet on this
view they would be making a mistake. Special scientists, even ideal ones, ultimately
don’t have any input into what is projectible in their domain.
Thus, we claim, while the Albert-Loewer view offers a non-conspiratorial and
supervenience-respecting account of the projectibility of some special science
generalizations, it plausibly fails to extend to many cases that we care about, and in
addition, extends to some cases that we don’t care about. The view requires its own
delicate contrivance: the sets G and T must more or less precisely overlap. Where
they do not, we have trouble. For gs not in T, conspiracy lives; for ts not in G,
autonomy dies.
5 The Better Best System
We have urged elsewhere (Cohen and Callender 2009) that a different way of
elaborating MRL—what we call the Better Best System theory, or BBS—solves the
internal problems facing classical MRL. We also believe that the same view can
answer to the needs of Sect. 1. In this section we’ll present BBS, briefly catalog
some of its benefits, and then consider the light it sheds on the conspiracy problem.
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5.1 BBS: A (Very) Short Synopsis
Recall that one of the most significant problems for MRL was its reliance on
simplicity, strength, and balance comparisons across systems that differ in their
basic kinds. It is possible to view the Albert-Loewer view as a way of circumventing
that problem by requiring a single microphysical language for the expression of all
true generalizations; unfortunately, for reasons already discussed, we strongly doubt
that this strategy can succeed. In contrast, BBS embraces the diversity of basic kinds
used by different sciences. The guiding idea is that even if there is no transcendently
Best System, nothing stops us from assessing the immanently strongest, simplest,
and best balanced axiomatizations relative to a specific choice of basic kinds K (/to a
specific choice of basic predicates PK). Given such an assessment relative to a
choice of basic kinds K (/predicates PK), we can say that a true generalization is
a law relative to K (/PK) just in case it appears in all the immanently Best Systems
relative to the basic kinds K (/basic predicates PK).
11
Although BBS has many attractions, we’ll content ourselves with listing just
three here.
First, since BBS is relativized to kinds in a way that MRL was not, it makes do
without transcendent comparisons, and thereby sidesteps the problem of immanent
comparisons.
Second, it renders unproblematic Lewis’s odd predicate ⌜F ⌝ that holds of all and
only things in the world where an arbitrary system S holds. The proponent of BBS
can accept that, if allowed to compete, the generalization ⌜(x)Fx⌝ is a Best System
for all such worlds. Yet she can remark that ⌜(x)Fx⌝ is not a Best System relative to
the kinds we care about. If we care about mass, charge, spin, etc., then relative to
these kinds, Schro¨dinger’s equation (for example) might result, not ‘all events are
F’. Properties like that picked out by ⌜F ⌝, and the ensuing threatened trivialization
of MRL are ruled out for lack of interest rather than any intrinsic deficiency. BBS
solves the problem by appeal to scientific interests rather than by appeal to
metaphysics, a solution much more in keeping, we believe, with the spirit of MRL.
Third, so long as the kinds in terms of which it is formulated are epistemically
accessible, BBS will also pass the empiricist loyalty test and so will make lawhood
epistemically accessible.
5.2 BBS on Special Science Laws
For the reasons set out above (among others), we think BBS holds significant
advantages over rival accounts. We now turn to the question of how well BBS
answers to the desiderata of Sect. 1. After arguing that the view nicely reconciles
lawhood with supervenience and autonomy in the special sciences, we’ll use it to
motivate a metaphysically deflationary treatment of the worry about conspiracy.
11 We are not the first to consider relativizing MRL. Earlier proponents of some such strategy include
Halpin (2003); Taylor (1993, p. 97); Roberts (1998). Indeed, it is possible to read Lewis (1983, p. 368) as
endorsing a relativized version of MRL in claiming that laws and kinds are chosen as a package deal.
BBS was developed prior to our discovery of a similar account of Schrenk (2008).
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We’ll argue that BBS respects our desiderata as well as we have reason to expect
that they should be respected, and additionally brings to light ways in which they
should not be respected.
We begin, then, by pointing out that BBS allows for the projectibility of special
science generalizations. Given BBS, all that is required for lawhood in a domain is
that a generalization figure in the on balance and immanently simplest and strongest
axiomatizations of that domain. We can axiomatize whatever domains we favor.
Every conceivable carving up of the world will, assuming we can make sense of
simplicity, strength and balance with respect to these kinds, result in a competition,
and where there is a winner, a Best System. That this should be possible in ecology
is no more puzzling for BBS than that it should be possible in physics. Significantly,
BBS doesn’t posit some threshold of strength or simplicity that must be had for
lawhood; consequently, BBS does not require that aspirants to the title of lawhood
should be universal and exceptionless. An incomplete generalization may be
sufficiently simpler than any complete one, and thereby gain entry into the Best
System. Nor does it require that they be translatable (simply or otherwise) into basic
vocabulary. Thus, given BBS, the existence of exceptions to special science
generalizations is no barrier to their lawhood.12
Consider supervenience next. Recall that the problem about supervenience we
raised against non-Humean Pluralism was that that view ensured special science
causal powers (and thereby sidestepped the conspiracy worry) only by adding extra
entities to its ontology, thus only by committing to the denial of supervenience. By
contrast, BBS is fully consistent with supervenience. While BBS has it that higher-
levels will contain kinds (say, rabbits) not present at lower levels, it does not require
in order for the projectibility of generalizations about such higher-level kinds the
addition of non-supervenient entities or events. Rather, on this approach, the laws
and kinds are what result from best systematizing (parts of) the Humean mosaic.
Significantly, and unlike, say, the internal realism of (Putnam 1987), the basic
ontological framework associated with BBS is a single world filled with events.
What it adds to this ontological framework is a conception of laws as certain kinds
of sophisticated summaries of the events. Now, because interests vary among
summarizers, some of these summaries will be best told with vocabularies that carve
up these events in different ways; and, to be sure, projectibility will fail to transfer
12 Claims to the contrary have often motivated philosophers to give up on lawhood in the special
sciences. BBS not only shows that law-alternatives are not necessary to account for the special sciences,
but in fact also naturally fills holes in some proposals. For example, Woodward (2000) develops a popular
invariance-based account of explanation to answer problems that arise in understanding special science
generalizations. According to this theory, “whether or not a generalization can be used to explain has to
do with whether it is invariant rather than with whether it is lawful. A generalization is invariant if it is
stable or robust in the sense that it would continue to hold under a relevant class of changes” (p. 197). But
which changes? And what provides the truth conditions for these counterfactuals? Woodward’s non-
reductive account is silent on these questions, and as a result, it may be viewed as circular if we insist on
an answer (i.e., the invariant generalizations are those that don’t change under the interventions that leave
them the same). BBS, by contrast, gives non-circular answers to these questions via the Best System for
that special science.
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between different of these summaries. But, crucially, that doesn’t mean that the
rabbits—or anything else—fail to supervene upon the basic events.13
Third, there is a clear sense in which the BBS special science generalizations
(/laws) are autonomous in a way they aren’t according to the Albert-Loewer view,
since BBS does not demand that the former are derivable from the truths (laws and
initial conditions) of fundamental physics. Consequently, BBS allows that the
correctness of special science generalizations does not depend on their eventual
vindication by the metrics of physics. In this, BBS is clearly on the side of scientific
practice: ecologists just don’t look over their shoulders to see what physicists are
doing before deciding whether an ecological generalization is on balance strong and
simple. When considering Malthus’s Law, ecologists are weighing the pros and cons
of this as a generalization of rabbits, and so on, not quarks. Economists, ecologists,
and so on use their own standards of balance, simplicity and strength, based on
organizing knowledge in their own domains, not fundamental physics. BBS respects
this fact, making the metaphysics of laws much closer to the methodological
practice.
Finally, we now want to argue that BBS reveals the conspiracy “problem” to be
overstated in certain ways, and therefore apt for dissolution rather than solution.
We’ll contend that BBS provides the resources to say just as much (but no more)
than needs to be said about the avoidance of conspiracy.
Recall that, while classical MRL did not address conspiracy directly, the two
other accounts we have considered so far attempt to solve (or dissolve) the worry
about conspiracy by adding entities to the world that ensure higher-level
generalizations hold. For Non-Humean Pluralists, the solution comes from the
top: non-Humeans populate the higher-level with “genuine” movers and shakers—
entities not reducible to lower-level generalizations—that make the higher-level
generalizations hold, irrespective of what happens below at subvenient levels. For
Albert and Loewer, the answer comes from below: proponents of this view build
into the physics the necessary ingredients to get rid of conspiratorial higher-level
behavior, so that it becomes likely that the universe unfolds in ecological, economic,
etc., ways. The problems with these views naturally raise the question: is there
instead a way to rid the world of higher-level conspiracies without adding entities?
13 In fairness, the issue of supervenience is somewhat more complicated than this lets on, partly because
BBS can be developed in so many different ways. One could, we suppose, combine a BBS-like
pluralistic-MRL story about laws with an internal-realist-like metaphysics according to which different
explanatory domains come with their own ontologies between which no supervenience relations hold.
That sort of a view would, of course, amount to a violation of supervenience. But the point in the main
text stands. Namely, BBS (unlike non-Humean pluralism) secures projectibility for the special sciences
without requiring the rejection of supervenience.
It is also worth remarking here that the supervenience of (say) rabbits upon (say) quantum fields will not
be visible (or, for that matter, stateable) in a Best System for ecology framed in terms of ecological kinds;
for an ecological Best System will lack the kind terms necessary to say anything at all about quantum
fields. On the other hand, the supervenience of rabbits on quantum fields will also be invisible from the
point of view of the Best System formulated in terms of physics, which (of course) lacks the requisite
higher level vocabulary. To actually see bridge principles linking the kinds of one level with the kinds of
another, one needs a Best System formulated with both sets of vocabulary available. While, of course, this
can happen (as it does with statistical mechanics, biochemistry, and more), there is no reason to insist on
the inclusion of such bridge principles as an acceptability condition for any particular Best System.
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We doubt it. We believe a certain amount of ‘conspiratorial’ behavior is virtually
inevitable if we demand that the higher-level is supervenient upon and yet
autonomous from the higher-level but refuse to add anything designed to nomically
ensure cooperation between levels. That said, we believe the costs of accepting
conspiracy are not as high as have been thought and that BBS offers a way of
looking at the issue that significantly blunts the worry. We have also argued that the
costs of solving the problem by the non-Humean and Albert-Loewer methods are
higher than their proponents think. A cost-benefit analysis is called for, therefore, in
which we evaluate how bad the original problem is.
To begin, we note that observers are tempted to posit conspiracies when events
(especially long runs of events) occur that are improbable relative to a chance. This
means that the conspiracy doesn’t get off the ground in the absence of a chance. Of
course, all manner of occurrences may be judged subjectively unlikely. But unless a
chance makes it into the Best System for that field, and the events are unlikely with
respect to that chance, then there is nothing to explain apart from the reason why
certain people have a psychological state of surprise at some events and not others.
An initial observation, then, is that the Best System for fundamental physics may
not posit a physical chance, contrary to what Albert and Loewer assume. If so, then,
strictly speaking, there is no conspiracy problem. No chance, no conspiracy. There
is only the undeniable feeling of surprise that the particles should behave that way.
But surprise that the initial conditions of the universe were such as to lead to
ecological patterns is like surprise at any other brute fact. One may equally be
surprised that the speed of light is roughly 180,000 miles/s. But in the absence of
chance, the initial condition, like the speed of light, is not objectively unlikely. In
the absence of a better theory, it’s not at all clear that one can legitimately judge
different brute facts as more or less likely to be true (cf. Callender 2004).
One might reply that statistical mechanics posits a chance over every physical
initial microstate, and we’re assuming supervenience, so it automatically assigns
chances to ecological generalizations, like it or not. This objection, in effect,
re-asserts the Albert-Loewer position of probabilistic completeness, and it serves to
remind us that there may be a cost incurred by rejecting it. The cost is that it may
turn out that a certain set of positions in the foundations of statistical mechanics
cannot be held consistently without adding a fundamental physical chance.
Obviously we cannot assess this worry here. However, we can point out that some
(Leeds 2003; Earman 2006) are skeptical about the relevant positions defended by
Albert (2001) for reasons independent of those we raise here. The foundations of
statistical mechanics are fraught with controversy (Sklar 1993), and there are indeed
many positions—whether desirable or not, we would have to see in a prolonged
discussion—that are at least consistent with the rejection of the ‘imperialist’ view of
chance defended by Albert and Loewer. These remarks are no substitute for
argument, of course, but they do indicate that many premises and arguments must be
supplied before we get probabilistic completeness from statistical mechanics.
Suppose we put these qualms aside for the sake of argument, and assume, with
Albert and Loewer, that fundamental physics does posit a chance, either over initial
conditions or through a stochastic dynamics. Then via supervenience every
ecological event gets a physical chance assigned to it. A conspiracy looms.
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However, we want to suggest that this doesn’t look so terrible from the perspective
of BBS. According to BBS, and contrary to classical MRL and Albert and Loewer,
ecology also has its own Best System. So we need to imagine a scenario in which
there are two Best Systems in play, the ecological and the physical.
Typically these two Best Systems will disagree in the chance assignments given
to any particular event. Why? The physical Best System is weighing the strengths
and weakness of a vast number of events compared to the ecological Best System.
Even in the unlikely event that physicists and ecologists held exactly the same
standards of balance, simplicity and strength, given the two quite different mosaics,
it would be amazing if they yielded the same chances for a given event. The
physical Best System might have to cut corners on the chances of a few rabbits
reproducing if it’s to simply describe (say) why so many galaxies are elliptical. In
contrast, the ecological Best System may miss things too by not seeing how physical
fluctuations might percolate up to the ecological level. Hence, given BBS, we
should expect disagreement all over the place among all the different Best Systems
over the chances of events. There will be some pressure toward convergence: the
frequencies of rabbits will be a small part of what physics wants to get right given
that rabbits supervene upon physical particles and fields. But in general we should
expect disagreement between the two Best Systems.
We can now make two (related) points.
First, assume the physical and ecological chance, found in their respective Best
Systems, differ with respect to a regularity. Ecology obviously rates the chances of
Malthus’s Law to be very high, so from its perspective, there is no conspiracy. Let’s
assume, to get a conspiracy, that the physical chance assigns patterns in accord with
Malthus’s Law a low chance. The first point, then, is that the problem is symmetric.
If physics deems the ecological generalization unlikely, then so does the ecological
generalization deem the physical motions unlikely from its perspective. If we insist
on talk of conspiracy, there’s no good way of saying whether the particles are
conspiring to behave like rabbits or the rabbits are conspiring to obey physics.14
Second, notice something already suggested above: ecology’s Best System will
see other conspiracies from its perspective. Why do the rabbits fall down rather than
up? Why do the rabbits’ speeds attain a maximum value where they do? These are
questions with answers in physics and physiology, but (we assume) no answer in the
Best System crafted from ecological kinds. How do the rabbits know to obey
physics and biology, the ecologist might wonder.
The lesson here is that there is a symmetry among Best Systems with respect to
conspiracies. The patterns of one Best System relative to a set of kinds K look
conspiratorial to the Best System relative to the set of kinds K’ when they are
talking about the same objects. There is no reason to privilege the physical system
and its worry about conspiracy over the ecological one. On a broadly Humean
theory like BBS, there is no distinguished level where the ‘real’ laws and causes
operate. The ecological events cause other ecological events just as much as the
14 Do the different values of chance of an event by different Best Systems signal that the theory is
inconsistent? No: as in the account of chance of Hoefer (2007), where chances are relative to set-up, and
the set-ups differ, here chances are relative to different Best Systems.
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physical events cause one another. Although there is an ontological asymmetry
(rabbits supervene on physical objects and not vice versa), the Best System for
ecology is no less true for that, nor its laws or causes less genuine. For these reasons,
there is no way to step back and say which conspiracy is the real one. Ecologists
must ‘solve’ the conspiracy ‘problem’ the same way physicists do—by accepting
that some of the total behavior will be a brute fact in the sense that it fails to be
likely according to their useful but proprietary laws and chances.
It might appear that we have multiplied conspiracy problems instead of solving
one. However, we are tempted by the opposite conclusion: if every Best System has
a conspiracy problem, then no Best System does. It seems that we are always going
to be stuck with some unaddressed projectible regularities at some levels that, in the
right frame of mind, feel conspiratorial. While we cannot be sure without knowing
more about the details of the relevant systems and events than anyone now does, we
strongly doubt that it is possible to rid every Best System of every putative
conspiracy by building in chances that make every conceivable pattern likely. For
any regularity highly weighted by some system, there is surely another, even if
framed in terms of gruesome kinds, that does not weigh that generalization (when
translated into its own kinds) highly.
Even if it were possible, abolishing “conspiracy” (i.e., abolishing all projectible
regularities not addressed in some particular Best System) in the way contemplated
is at odds with BBS’s recognition of scientists’ appeal to local standards when
developing Best Systems for their fields (cf. Kitcher 2003). Given that standards are
local, it is unsurprising that there are certain behaviors not made likely according to
the Best System for a fixed set of kinds K. To insist that this not happen, to have all
the Systems give high probabilistic weight to each other’s patterns in a delicately
balanced harmony, is to ask, implausibly, that every system be sensitive to all
interests outside its scope. We doubt strongly that this can be made (or should be
expected) to work, and so see “conspiracy” as virtually inevitable.
On the other hand, from our point of view, the existence of projectible (e.g.,
special science) regularities not addressed by particular (e.g., fundamental physical)
Best Systems seems less like a problem and more like a predictable fact of life in a
complex world. This situation would indeed look problematic if the discovery of
higher-level projectibility required the postulation of extra-Humean elements or
probabilistic vindication at the lower-level. But BBS dispenses with these
requirements. Adopting BBS means, among other things, refusing to single out a
Best System as the unique locus of projectibility. Having done that, it will be no
surprise to discover projectibility outside the scope of any one System. In any case,
such a discovery should not motivate fantasies of conspiracy.
6 Conclusion
The existence of (projectible) special science laws not guaranteed by the
fundamental laws can seem puzzling from certain points of view. However, we
have argued that much of the puzzle can be rendered innocuous, especially once we
have adopted an adequate framework for thinking about laws. Indeed, given our
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conception of laws, it would be more puzzling if there were not high-level laws not
guaranteed by the fundamental laws. Therefore, we suggest that special science laws
should not be taken as occasions for the promulgation of conspiracy theories.15
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